To call Russian Armed Forces a “Paper Tiger” would be a big mistake. To base future defense budgets on Russia’s recent performance on the battlefield would be an even bigger mistake. Hopefully after examining the information presented here, you will agree that the Russian Armed Forces were hampered primarily by (current) poor leadership. The systemic problems of corruption and embezzlement, nepotism, alcoholism, dependence on a defense budget with misguided priorities, dependence on a mercenary army (in what other country does the Minister of Defense own a Private Military Company?), lack of a professional military, an ill-conceived conscript program, fielding expensive high-tech weaponry that is difficult to maintain and a litany of other serious issues – but all could have been overcome with proper leadership.
One reason for the loss of so many high-ranking officers can be traced to the rigid structure of the Russian military itself. Generals are given broad strategic authority, which they execute at the command level, but they are notoriously involved at the tactical level as well. As a result, small-unit leadership is poor in the modern Russian army. Senior leaders are expected to lead from the front. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, as of August, Russia in its “special military operation”, which, according to Putin, is going according to plan, had already lost about 40 thousand military personnel, of which 10 were generals, more than 1,700 tanks, more 3,900 armored combat vehicles, more than 2,800 vehicles, more than 100 air defense systems, more than 200 aircraft, more than 180 helicopters, more than 700 operational-tactical UAVs and 15 ships/boats. Basically, abandoned Russian hardware made Russia Ukraine’s biggest supplier of arms. Ukrainians captured more hardware than was provided by the West.
That said, it is reasonable to believe that with new leadership and a major shift in the command-and-control structure, Russian armed forces will implement many changes Post-Putin over a period of time and renew the ability to defend the nation. In reality, the only reason Ukraine has not launched a major attack on the Russian homeland is the tremendous restraint shown by Ukraine’s leadership. The objective is to kick out the Russian invaders and not aggression against the Russian population.
In this book, I examine the current situation and describe changes (I believe) the next Russian Government will make to clean house and restore a professional military. Obviously, it will take a long time to implement the physical and personnel changes necessary and probably the most difficult will be the calcified mindset of the “old-guard.”
Table of Contents
RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
Ministry Structure
RUSSIAN DEFENSE BUDGET
RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES
Russian Ground Forces
Russian Aerospace Forces
Leadership
Order of Battle
Aircraft Operated
Russian Navy
Leadership
Russian Strategic Rocket Forces
Leadership
Units
Numbers of Missiles and Warheads
Russian Airborne Forces
Leadership
Combat Forces
Russian Special Operations Forces
Leadership
Russian Logistical Support
The National Guard (Rosgvardiya)
Leadership
Structure
Border Service
Leadership
Regional Border Districts
MILITARY DISTRICTS
Western Military District
Western Military District Formations and Units
1st Guards Tank Army
6th Combined Arms Army
20th Guards Combined Arms Arm
Intelligence/Spetsnaz Units and Formations
Naval Forces
Naval Infantry and Coast Defense
11th Army Corps (Kaliningrad)
Aerospace Forces
Russian Aerospace Forces - Not Subordinate to Western Military District
Southern Military District
Component Units
58th Army (Vladikavkaz)
8th Combined Arms Army (Novocherkassk)
49th Combined Arms Army (Stavropol/Maykop)
Airborne Troops
Special Forces/Reconnaissance
Air Force Units
Naval Forces
Order of Battle
Black Sea Fleet Ground Forces, Naval Infantry and Surface-to-Surface Missile Forces
Black Sea Region Aviation and Air Defense Forces
Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command
Bases
Naval Forces
Submarines
Surface Warships
Aviation and Air Defense Forces
Northern Fleet Naval Infantry Forces
Naval Infantry/Special Forces
Ground Forces
Defensive Combat Divers
Central Military District
Component Units
Ground Forces
Main Directorate of General Staff
Airborne Troops
Air Force
Joint-Service Ceremonial Units
Eastern Military District
Component Units
29th Army (Chita)
5th Red Banner Army (Ussuriysk)
68th Army Corps (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk)
35th Army (Belogorsk)
36th Army (Ulan Ude)
Air and Air Defense Forces
Russian Naval Forces
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
Wagner Group
DSHRG Rusich
Order of battle for the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
Initial Groupings: February 2022
Leadership Changes
Chain of Command
LIST OF RUSSIAN GENERALS KILLED DURING 2022 INVASION OF UKRAINE
RESTRUCTURING THE TACTICAL RUSSIAN ARMY FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA’S MILITARY
This book is NOT available on Amazon. NEW for 2023. Download PDF below, please make a $10 donation on Patreon.
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
Copyright © 2023 4th Watch Publishing Company - All Rights Reserved.
This website uses cookies. By continuing to use this site, you accept our use of cookies.