
This is new for November 2021. It provides an introductory overview of the various ships that constitute the People's Armed Police, part of China's broader military strategy and operations. The book includes open source specifications, detailing the MMSI, IMO, and Call Sign of these ships. With these numbers, you can determine the current location of a vessel, as well as its speed and destination if it's in motion. Additionally, you can track where it just came from. The Table of Contents organizes the ships by class and in numeric order, encapsulating a wide range of military hardware utilized by the People's Liberation Army.
Hull Classes covered in the book include:
ZHAOTOU Class
SHUOSHI II Class
KANJIE Class
ZHAOLAI Class
ZHAODUAN Class
SHUCHA I Class
SHUCHA II Class
ZHAOCHANG Class
TUZHONG Class
ZHAOYU Class
HAIYANG Class
ZHAOJUN Class
JIANGWEI I Class
SHUWU Class
ZHAOTIM Class
SHUSHENG Class
ZHAOGAO Class
TYPE 92211 Class
HAIXUN II Class
SHUKE I Class
SHUKE II Class
SHUKE III Class
SHUYOU Class
ZHAODAI Class
ZHAOMING Class
HUTAO I Class
YOUDIAN Class
HAIJING WAGOR Class
HULAI II Class
ICEBREAKERS
HONGMING II WPC Class
HONGSHOU WPC Class
SHAOKAO WPB Class
ZHONGKE WPG Class
ZHONGYU WPS Class
SHUZAO II/III WPG Class
TYPE 618B-II WPG Class
ZHONGMEL WPG Class

In today’s world, mankind is increasingly becoming a community with a shared future where interests are intertwined and security and safety are mutual. China is currently at a critical stage of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and embarking on a new journey to comprehensively construct a modern socialist country. Socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era. To articulate China’s defensive national defense policy in this new era, and to highlight the purpose and significance of its military strategy, including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese government published the white paper titled “China's National Defense in the New Era.”
Released in 2019, this white paper includes details about China’s announced defense spending up to 2018. China reported that its military budget for 2017 increased by 7 percent, reaching 1.044 trillion yuan ($151.43 billion), which is about one-quarter of the proposed U.S. defense spending for that year. However, this figure omits some significant expenses. Reports from various sources indicate that China’s publicly released military budget does not accurately reflect the substantial increases in military-related items in recent years. For instance, China’s military budget for 2022 surged to an estimated $711 billion, more than triple the claimed $229 billion, and nearly equal to the U.S. military budget for that year. This is noteworthy since the U.S. defense budget reflects global military commitments, whereas China’s budget is primarily focused on its local geographic area of responsibility.
Historically, China has disclosed top-line budget figures without detailed explanations, categorizing expenditures into three broad areas: equipment, training and maintenance, and personnel. Pentagon reports have indicated that China’s announced defense budget “omits several major categories of expenditures and its actual military-related spending is significantly higher.” Notable omissions include uncounted paramilitary organizations like the People’s Armed Police (PAP), which plays a crucial role in internal state security and supports the PLA in military conflicts. Additionally, China’s Coast Guard, a fleet of 150 ships operating alongside the PLA Navy, is another significant absence in the budget. The budget also neglects to account for China's space forces, military satellites, and expanding counter-space capabilities. Furthermore, many military functions are funded through civilian budgets, which encompass military demobilization, retirement, pensions, military construction, arms imports, military research and development (R&D) programs, and investments in dual-use technology. The cost of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), which can be rapidly mobilized when necessary, is also covered by these civilian budgets. Given all this, the information in the White Paper requires careful examination to distinguish fact from fiction in relation to China’s military strategy.

This is a new book for 2021, offering an introductory overview of various intelligence agencies in Communist China. It highlights key aspects of Chinese military strategy, including the facilities, general locations, and collection platforms across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains. In particular, it examines crucial SIGINT sites integral to the People's Liberation Army's operations, such as: SIGINT Sites Changi, Chengdu, Dingyuanchen, Guangzhou, Hainan Island, Nanjing, Shanghai, Shenyang, Coco Islands in Myanmar, Sittwe in Myanmar, Zedetkyi Kyun in Myanmar, Sop Hao in Laos, and strategic maritime locations like Cuarteron Reef (Huayang Jiao, 华阳礁), Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshu Jiao, 永暑礁), Gaven Reefs (Nanxun Jiao, 南薰礁), Johnson Reef (Chiguo Jiao, 赤瓜礁), Hughes Reef (Dongmen Jiao, 东门礁), Mischief Reef (Meiji Jiao, 美济礁), Subi Reef (Zhubi Jiao, 渚碧礁), and the Paracel Islands, including Woody Island (Yongxing Dao, 永興島). The book also discusses the support base in Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti, Canton Island in Kiribati, and possible Atlantic Navy base locations, along with insights into military hardware such as those observed on Possession Island (Namibia) and Anaburu in Guinea-Bissau.

1. Subi Reef (Zhubi Jiao, 渚碧礁)
2. Cuarteron Reef (Huayang Jiao, 华阳礁)
3. Gaven Reefs (Nanxun Jiao, 南薰礁)
4. Johnson Reef (Chiguo Jiao, 赤瓜礁)
5. Hughes Reef (Dongmen Jiao, 东门礁)
6. Mischief Reef (Meiji Jiao, 美济礁)
7. Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshu Jiao, 永暑礁)
China’s large-scale land reclamation efforts are intricately woven into its military strategy, particularly concerning the deployment of military hardware by the People's Liberation Army. In July 2016, a specially constituted arbitral tribunal determined that three of the seven reefs China occupies (Dongmen Jiao, Meiji Jiao, and Zhubi Jiao) were naturally above water only at low tide. The other four reefs (Chiguo Jiao, Yongshu Jiao, Nanxun Jiao, and Huayang Jiao) were classified as mere “rocks” not entitled to extensive maritime rights. According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, these three low-tide elevations do not confer rights to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or continental shelf. However, there are exceptions for features like Zhubi Jiao and Dongmen Jiao situated within the territorial waters of other features. Unlike full islands, China’s four rock features can only claim a territorial sea as they “cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.” Importantly, it is worth noting that human construction cannot alter the legal status of these land features or their associated entitlements to maritime rights. Fully artificial islands like Meiji Jiao are only entitled to a limited 500-meter “safety zone.”

This is probably the toughest book I’ve attempted, particularly given the limited open-source information available on military hardware related to Chinese military strategy and the lockdown due to Covid-19. Nonetheless, I decided to move forward and publish what I've gathered, as there are so few books covering the People's Liberation Army's vehicles. This marks just the beginning, as there are numerous military vehicles I plan to explore and add to this collection. Please reach out to let me know which ones I may have missed, and I will do my best to include them. The cover features graphical elements representing a Table of Contents, with page numbers listed prior to each vehicle name. Additionally, I dislike seeing blank pages, so I've included a cover page with suggested titles that might pique your interest. If you have suggestions for future titles, please share them, and I will assess the available information in an effort to publish those titles. Thank you for your continued support. 4th Watch publishing is a SDVOSB.

This short book presents examples of China’s land-based and airborne platforms with electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, which are critical components of the Chinese military strategy. Unfortunately, specific specifications for most of the EW equipment are missing. There is very little open source information available regarding the specifications or even the intended use of many of the People's Liberation Army’s (PLA) EW weapons. I have not included ship-based EW hardware, as there is almost no open source material available to discuss. However, some insight into a platform’s EW capability can be gained through a close examination of the weapons on parade and at static displays during trade shows. If you have additional information, please send it to us for inclusion by visiting our website: USGOVPUB.COM. We will keep the book updated as we discover more details. Please check the date on the book. PRINTED IN COLOR.
I began this book under the impression that electronic warfare was merely another military asset with a secondary role in conducting war. However, EW has evolved into something much more significant. The advancement of military 'intelligentization' (军事智能化) by the People's Liberation Army, alongside the integration of cyber capabilities, psychological warfare, artificial intelligence, robotics, ELINT, MASINT, and COMINT, has positioned EW as a highly potent weapon—possibly the most crucial weapon the PLA will possess in the future. Understanding how these diverse technological components interconnect to influence the battlespace in both military and non-military domains is a developing field of study, illustrated by recent conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, and beyond.
Intelligentized warfare relies on the integrity of information and effective communication systems while simultaneously employing suppressive jamming and firepower. Multi-million-dollar high-tech military hardware can be sidelined by relatively low-cost electronic warfare weapons. Consequently, EW is an area that the military cannot afford to view as a minor role. If left unchecked, the disruptive influence of EW could play a decisive role in determining the outcomes of future wars.
Within the People's Liberation Army, the SSF Network Systems Department is tasked with information warfare, encompassing responsibilities that include cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare.
LAND-BASED EW VEHICLES
Type 08 Electronic Warfare APC
ZBL-09 “Snow Leopard” EW APC
EQ2050 4x4 SIGINT and EW Station
EQ2050 4x4 EW Jammer Vehicle
EQ2101 6x6 Automated Jamming Station
EQ2101 6x6 EW Mobile Command Post
SX2190 EW Reconnaissance Vehicle
SX2190 6x6 Ground-To-Air Electronic Protection
TAS5501 10x10 EW Truck
Shaanxi SX2190 6x6 EW Truck
UAV Swarm Launch Vehicle
EW SIGINT and Drone Jammer Station
Over-The-Horizon Backscatter Radar at Mischief Reef (Meiji Jiao 美济礁)
AIRBORNE EW PLATFORMS
AVIC AG600 Amphibious Aircraft (Kun Dragon)
ASN-207 MAME EW, ECM UAV
BZK-005 “Giant Eagle” MALE/HALE ELINT
H-6G Bomber with ECM Pods
J-16D Radar-Jamming Electronic Warfare Aircraft (Red Eagle)
J-17 Carrier-Based EW (Electric Shark)
JH-7 EW Noise Jammer “Flying Leopard”
KJ-600 Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft
KJ-2000 AWACS Aircraft (Mainring)
NUAA RKL 165 UAV
Y-8 EW VARIANTS
Y-8CA ECM
Y-8CB ELINT/ECM
Y-8DZ ELINT
Y-8G ECM
Y-8GX3 Jammer
Y-8GX4 ELINT
Y-8GX5 AWACS
Y-8GX6 Maritime Patrol Aircraft
Y-8GX7 PSYOPS
Y-8GX-8 ELINT
Y-8GX-9 AWACS
Y-8GX-10 AEW
Y-8GX-11 ELINT
Y-8J ELINT AWACS
Y-8JB ELINT
Y-8T C3I/ECM Cub/High New 4
Y-8W AWACS High New 5
Y-8Q ASW Cub/High New 6
Y-9JZ High New 8
Y-8X Maritime Patrol Aircraft
Y-8 AWACS
Y-8 AWACS
Y-8EW
Y-8 Gunship
ZDK-03 AWACS9
ZDK-06
TO518 AWACS
Y-9 EW Variants
Y-9JB ELINT
Y-9XZ PSYOPS
Y-9W / KJ-500 AWACS
Y-9G ECM
Y-9JZ ELINT High New 8
WZ-7 (Soar Dragon) HALE Reconnaissance UCAV

This book features a collection of color photographs and drawings, alongside open source specifications for significant military hardware used by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), including Chinese Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV), suicide drones, and spaceplanes that are currently operational or in development. The PLA has deployed a diverse array of UAVs across its five branches: the PLA Army (PLAA), Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), Rocket Force (PLARF/former Second Artillery Force), and the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). A review of open sources has identified over 1,600 different UAVs of all types. However, due to the confidential nature of some programs, not every vehicle can be included, as images for certain highly classified systems are unavailable. I have narrowed this extensive list down to those vehicles deemed to possess military significance, particularly those capable of carrying substantial payloads or showcasing advanced technologies such as mature artificial intelligence or autonomous swarm capabilities. Consequently, options like blimps, most helicopters, and micro aerial vehicles (MAV) have been excluded. My focus primarily rests on UCAVs specifically designed for reconnaissance and strike missions, aligning with the broader context of Chinese military strategy.
Some notable vehicles discussed include:
- Shenlong Reusable Robotic VTHL Spaceplane “Divine Dragon”
- Tengyun Reusable Robotic TSTO, HTHL “Cloud Climber”
- Aotian-1 SECRET Spaceplane Concept
- CASC CH-7 “Rainbow-7” Stealth UCAV (X-47B Clone)
- Aisheng ASN-229 Reconnaissance/Strike UCAV
This section covers only vehicles from A-C, underscoring the expansive range of military hardware developed by the People's Liberation Army.

This handy pocket-size (6 by 9 inch) guide is based on the UNCLASSIFIED Oct 2019 Chart from the Office of Naval Intelligence. It features a precise silhouette of the military hardware operated by the People's Liberation Army, as well as units from the China Coast Guard, Maritime Militia, Maritime Transport, Border Defense, Maritime Safety Administration, and other Chinese government organizations. Understanding this guide is essential for grasping the nuances of Chinese military strategy.

20 JULY 2020 Printed in COLOR. This book features an extensive analysis of China's air defense weaponry, showcasing various military hardware utilized by the People's Liberation Army, alongside specifications derived from open sources. We will continue to update this publication as more information becomes available regarding Chinese military strategy. 4th Watch Publishing Co. is a SDVOSB (Vietnam era). Please send comments through https://usgovpub.com.
These are some of the systems included in this book:
DK-9 (霹雳-9; lit.: 'Thunderbolt-9')
DK-10 (LY-60) / DK-10 (PL-12) / DK-10A
DN-2 Dong Neng-2 (动能-2; 'Kinetic Energy 2')
DN-3 Dong Neng-3 (动能-3; 'Kinetic Energy 3')
FB-6 / FB-6C “Avenger” SAM
FB-10C (飛豹,‘Flying Leopard’)
FD-2000 / HQ-9 Long Range SAM
FJ ABM (反击Fan Ji) ‘Counter Strike’
FK-1000 Self-Propelled Anti-Air System (SPAAG/SAM)
FL-2000(V) (飛豹2000車載) ‘Flying Leopard’
FL-3000N CIWS (飞豹, 'Flying Leopard')
FLG-1 Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
FLS-1 Naval Surface-to-Air Missile System
FLV-1 Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
FM-3000 Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
FN/FY-6/FN-6A (飞弩-6; Fēi Nú-6) 'Flying Crossbow-6'
FN-16/FY-16 (飞弩-16; Fēi Nú-16)
FT-2000 Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
HN-5 (红缨-5; Hóng Yīng-5) 'Red Tassel-5'
HN-6 (红缨-6; Hóng Yīng-6) 'Red Tassel-6'
HQ-1 (红旗-1,Hóng Qí-1) SA-2 GUIDELINE
HQ-2 (红旗-2,Hóng Qí-2) SA-2 GUIDELINE
HQ-6 / HQ-6D (红旗-6,Hóng Qí-6) Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
HQ-7 / FM-90 (红旗-7,Hóng Qí-7) ‘Red Banner-7’
HQ-9 (红旗-9,Hóng Qí-9) ‘Red Banner-9’
HQ-10 (红旗-9,Hóng Qí-10) SA-20A GARGOYLE
HQ-12 (红旗-12,Hóng Qí-12) Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
HQ-15 (红旗-15,Hóng Qí-15) Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
HQ-16C (紅旗-16,Hóng Qí-16) SA-17 GRISSLY
HQ-17 (红旗-17,Hóng Qí-17) SA-15 GAUNTLET
HQ-18 (红旗-18,Hóng Qí-18) SA-12 GLADIATOR/ GIANT)
HQ-19 (红旗-19,Hóng Qí-19) S-300 SPSAM
HQ-22 (红旗-22,Hóng Qí-22) Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
HQ-26 (红旗-26,Hóng Qí-26)
HQ-29 (红旗-29.Hóng Qí-29) Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
HQ-61 (红旗-61,Hóng Qí-61) Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
HQ-64 (红旗-64,Hóng Qí-64) Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
KS-1A (凯山一号, Kai Shan-1) SA-2 GUIDELINE
KS-1000 (開山1000, Kai Shan-1000)
LS-II ADS (猎手, Lie Shou) “Hunter” II
LY-60 / FD-60 / PL10 Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
LY-80 (鹘,Lie Ying-80) "Falcon" Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
PL-12 (霹雳-12, Pī Lì-12) 'Thunderbolt-12'
QW Series Missiles
QW-1 (錢偉-1,Qian Wei-1) ‘Vanguard’
QW-2 (錢偉-2,Qian Wei-2) ‘Vanguard’
QW-2 Type 95 SPAAG/SAM
CQW-2 (车载先锋 Che-zai Qian Wei-2) ‘Vanguard’
QW-3 (錢偉-3,Qian Wei-3)
QW-4 (錢偉-4,Qian Wei-4)
QW-11 (錢偉-11,Qian Wei-11)
QW-18 (錢偉-18,Qian Wei-18)
S-75 Dvina (Desna/V-750) SA-2 GUIDELINE
S-300FM/S-300PM SA-10d/e GRUMBLE
S-400 SA-21 GROWLER
S-500 Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)
SC-19 (FT-1 Feitian) Road-Mobile Emergency Satellite Launch System
Shengong-II (神弓-II,Deity Bow-II) Air Defense System
Sky Dragon 50 (Tianlong 12) Self-Propelled Surface-to-Air Missile System (SPSAM)

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF; 中国人民解放军火箭军) plays a crucial role in the military strategy of the People's Republic of China, serving as both the strategic and tactical missile forces. Previously known as the Second Artillery Corps (SAC; 第二炮兵), the PLARF is equipped with advanced military hardware that includes a variety of missiles designed for different purposes. Among these are:
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV)
- DF-ZF Hypersonic Glide Vehicle
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)
- DF-41
- DF-31A
- DF-31AG / DF-31B
- DF-4
- DF-5
- DF-5A
- DF-5B
- DF-5C
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM)
- DF-26
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM)
- DF-21A
- DF-21C
- DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
- DF-16
- DF-17
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)
- DF-15A
- DF-15B
- DF-11A
- DF-12
- B-611M
In the realm of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), the PLARF also possesses advanced options such as:
- CJ-10A Cruise Missile
- DF-100 Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM)
This array of military assets underscores the strength and capabilities of the People's Liberation Army in maintaining China's defense readiness.

This book explores 21st-century warfare as if Sun Tzu were alive today, with a focus on Chinese military strategy and the concept of information dominance (zhixinxiquan) in alignment with China’s grand strategy of winning without fighting. The emerging concept of 'informationized operations (信化战 or xinxi hua zuozhan)' introduces dimensions that Sun Tzu could not have anticipated. However, much of Sun Tzu's strategic thinking can still be applied effectively to modern conflicts. This discussion extends beyond merely hacking into an adversary’s computer systems to assess military hardware and intentions; it also considers the opponent’s capability to use information strategically to shape the battlespace, thereby increasing the likelihood of victory while minimizing the risk of detection. Mastery of 'integrated network electronic warfare (INEW)' is crucial, particularly because the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not engaged in a major conflict since 1979, leading to virtually no combat experience in high-tech warfare under informationized conditions.

The aircraft listed here are regarded as some of the most sophisticated military hardware in the world and should be taken very seriously by any adversary, particularly in the context of Chinese military strategy. I am presenting the aircraft in numerical order, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designations where available. It's uncertain whether all these aircraft are entirely 'real' or just a product of wishful thinking. However, it's important to acknowledge that having blueprints for an exact replica of a specific aircraft doesn't guarantee it will operate in the same way. Modern aircraft are increasingly reliant on the software controlling their fly-by-wire systems as much as on the skill of the pilot. Even if one has the appropriate materials—where metallurgy plays a crucial role—and can manufacture the parts correctly, they still need to successfully assemble and test the final product under the scrutiny of the People's Liberation Army standards.
Bomber Aircraft
H-6 Jet Bomber/Transport/Air Refueling
H-20 Strategic Stealth Bomber
Fighter Aircraft
J-7 Jet Fighter NATO: Fishcan D
JH-7 Jet Fighter NATO: Flounder
J-8 Jet Fighter NATO: Finback C
J-10 Jet Multirole NATO: Firebird A
J-11 Jet Multirole NATO: Flanker L
J-14 Stealth Fighter Concept
J-15 Jet Multirole NATO: Flanker X2
L-15 Training/Light Attack Fighter “Falcon”
J-18 VSTOL Jet Fighter “Red Eagle”
J-20 Stealth Jet Fighter “Mighty Dragon/Firefang”
J-26 STOVL Jet Fighter
J-31 Stealth Jet Fighter “Gryfalcon”
Su-27 Jet Fighter NATO: Flanker
Su-30 Jet Multirole NATO: Flanker G
Su-35 Jet Multirole NATO: Flanker E/Super Flanker
Helicopters
SA 342L Transport Helicopter Aérospatiale “Gazelle”
Z-8 Attack Helicopter /Patrol
Z-9 Attack Helicopter NATO: Haitun
Z-18 Attack Helicopter
Z-19 Attack Helicopter
Ka-28 Attack Helicopter NATO: Helix-A
Mi-17 Transport Helicopter NATO: Hip
Chinese Osprey Transport Helicopter
Unmanned Aircraft
WZ-8 Rocket-powered, air-launched UAV
GJ-11 UAV “Sharp Sword”
CH-7 UAV “Rainbow-7”

Recently, it was announced that China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy now has more ships (300) than the U.S. Navy (287). This book covers the bulk of China’s military hardware, including destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. These categories have experienced more growth since 2005 than any other. The rapid expansion of ships in these categories aligns with the Chinese military strategy outlined in 2015, which states, “…the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from 'offshore waters defense' to a combination of 'offshore waters defense' with 'open seas protection,' and build a combined, multi-functional, and efficient marine combat force structure.” The launching of new ships complements the retirement of very old vessels (pre-1990) and the modernization of those built after that. This focus aligns with the strategic goal of creating defensive “rings” in the seas surrounding China. It's reminiscent of the bar fight scene in the movie “A Bronx Tale,” where the boss locks the front door and declares, “Now you’se can’t get out.” I suspect this plan will fully materialize by the year 2025; wait any longer, and this new batch of ships may become outdated. While U.S. Navy ships are generally larger and the U.S. boasts more aircraft carriers—China has one active, one being fitted out, and 2 (or 3) under construction—we have included new information on China’s aircraft carriers, though details remain scarce. We will update this section as more information becomes available. In late September, we updated to include transport ships (Type 071, 072, 073, 074, and 075) as well as the Type 22 Missile Boat, with at least 83 in service. This boat is well-suited for littoral operations, and its numbers could overwhelm an opponent, but it lacks effectiveness without robust air defense. Don't miss the electromagnetic rail gun mounted on the Type 072III Transport Ship. This book does not delve into the ships of the PLA Navy Reserve Force, the People's Armed Police (PAP), or the China Militia (中国民), but these topics could warrant another book if there is sufficient interest. Let us know if we should print these by logging into our website and sending a comment at USGOVPUB.COM.

We decided to publish this as a separate book since the submarine force, integral to Chinese military strategy, is large and growing in significance within the People's Liberation Army. We attempted to confirm the information from several sources, but there is a lot of disinformation out there regarding military hardware. If you come across any anomalies, please let us know, and we will make the necessary corrections.

Science of Military Strategy - 2020
This is the most recent release of this seminal work, now translated into English. We provide a Table of Contents on the back cover for quick reference, ensuring accessibility to readers interested in Chinese military strategy. We print these compact, tightly-bound paperback editions as a service, so you don’t have to. The books are full-size (8 ½ by 11 inches), feature large text, and have a glossy cover. 4th Watch Publishing Co. is a Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB). Below is an excerpt.
Chapter 8. 战略威慑 (Strategic Deterrence) Strategic deterrence plays a crucial role in military strategic planning and guidance, serving as an effective means to maintain national security and support the development of military hardware. With advancements in military technology and the expanding use of new domains, the role of strategic deterrence has become increasingly prominent within the framework of the People's Liberation Army. In this new era, flexible use of strategic deterrence means is necessary to create favorable strategic situations, contain armed conflicts, delay the outbreak of wars, and prevent escalation, thereby safeguarding national security and development interests.
Section One: Basic Concepts of Strategic Deterrence Although the thought and practice of strategic deterrence have been around since ancient times, its basic concept has not been accurately defined throughout history. Post-World War II, the emergence and development of modern strategic deterrence theory have led to extensive research into its definition, elements, types, and functions.
The meaning of strategic deterrence Strategic deterrence involves the comprehensive use of various means by a country and its military to achieve specific political goals based on robust military strength. This is executed through a clever demonstration of strength and a resolve to utilize that strength, making the opposing party confront unreasonable, or even unbearable, consequences. As a result, the adversary is compelled to concede, compromise, or surrender in military engagements. Compared to actual combat, the strength demonstrated through strategic deterrence is lower, cost-effective, and allows for greater maneuverability. Under certain circumstances, it can directly attain political objectives, making it an essential strategy for maintaining national security.
Strategic deterrence targets the psychological, cognitive, and decision-making processes of opponents, driving them to recognize necessary measures based on benefits and losses. The perception of significant costs and losses, beyond their capacity or benefit, enhances the power of reasoning and decision-making, rendering deterrence more effective. For effective strategic deterrence, three fundamental elements are essential: strength, determination, and information transfer. Strength forms the foundation of deterrence; without it, attempts at deterrence can merely be perceived as bluster. This strength can be categorized into hard power and soft power, with hard power encompassing the military capabilities, population, economic prowess, and scientific advancements of a nation. Soft power, on the other hand, includes political influence, diplomatic capability, cultural appeal, and national cohesion, amplifying the effect of hard power. Determination is crucial for successful deterrence; a lack of resolve can lead to.
The 2020 version provides additional context to the 2013 document and should further clarify some of the meaning. Printed full size (8 1/2 by 11 inches) with large text.

This is the complete translation of "The Science of Campaigns" [战役学], 2nd ed., Beijing: National Defense University [国防大学出版社], 2006. I have been unable to find an English language copy, which prompted me to take on the task of translating it into English myself. While I am not a scholar of the Chinese language, particularly in the context of Chinese military strategy, I hope you will overlook my limitations in literacy. I believe this translation remains faithful to the original text; however, I have taken some poetic license to enhance its readability. To maintain clarity regarding military hardware references and the operations of the People's Liberation Army, I have decided to limit the translated text on any given page to match the numbered pages in this book. Thus, if you find some of my edits confusing—and happen to be a Chinese scholar—you’ll know exactly which page to reference in the original Chinese edition.
This is a 2-Volume book. Find both volumes on Amazon.com, as well as the ePub.
This is one of the most authoritative publicly available sources on Chinese military thinking about the campaign level of warfare. Printed full size (8 1/2 by 11 inches) with large text.
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